This paper identifies the interaction between corporate hedging and liquidity policies as an important mechanism through which hedging affects corporate financing and firm value. To motivate our empirical investigation, we present a theoretical model that shows how corporate hedging facilitates greater reliance on cost-effective, externally-provided liquidity in lieu of costly internal resources. We then test our predictions by employing a new empirical approach that separates cash flow hedging from fair value hedging. Using detailed, hand-collected data on corporate hedging, we construct instruments to show that cash flow hedging reduces the firm's precautionary demand for cash and allows it to rely relatively more on bank lines of credit. Furthermore, we find a significant positive effect of cash flow hedging on firm value. Overall, our results identify a new mechanism through which hedging affects corporate financial policies and firm value.
Introduction
What are the financial consequences and value implications of corporate hedging? Clearly, the uncertainty of cash flows and the risk of adverse cash flow shocks are central concerns in corporate finance, and shareholders and managers take them seriously. 1 Yet, the overall value effect of risk management and corporate hedging is unclear (e.g., Guay and Kothari (2003) , Adam and Fernando (2006) , and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2009) ). This paper sheds new light on the consequences of corporate hedging. We apply a new approach to distill the cash flow effects of hedging, and identify corporate liquidity policy as an important channel through which hedging affects financial policies, and as a result, firm value.
To motivate our empirical investigation, we model the interaction between the firm's hedging policy and its liquidity choice of cash holdings vis-à-vis bank lines of credit. Facing current and expected future investment opportunities, the firm chooses its optimal hedging and liquidity policies taking into account the uncertainty of future cash flows. Although holding liquid assets can mitigate the risk of underinvestment due to cash flow shortfalls, cash holdings typically entail a liquidity premium as a result of sub-optimal investments today. The alternative of bank lines of credit does not require forgoing valuable investments today, but is contingent on satisfying a cash flow based financial covenant. This is where cash flow hedging is useful: It reduces the likelihood of violating the financial covenant, and therefore allows the firm to rely more on lines of credit in lieu of cash, thus enhancing firm value by reducing the liquidity premium. Importantly, the model assumes that cash flow hedging is mean-preserving and therefore does not generate a mechanical positive relation between hedging and firm value. Overall, the model highlights the interaction between corporate hedging and liquidity policies as 1 See, for instance, Rawls and Smithson (1990) , Bodnar, Hyat, and Marston (1998) , Graham and Harvey (2001) , and Lins, Servaes, and Tufano (2009). means to address cash flow risks. 2 We test the implications of our model by employing a new empirical approach that isolates the effects of cash flow hedging. Specifically, we take advantage of the 2001 accounting standard SFAS No. 133, which requires firms, for the first time, to distinguish between cash flow hedging and fair value hedging in the financial statements. We hand-collect detailed data on corporate hedging, and construct a number of instruments to identify the causal effect of cash flow hedging on the firm's liquidity policy and, as a consequence, its value. We find that cash flow hedging reduces the firm's precautionary demand for cash and allows it to rely relatively more on bank of lines credit for liquidity provision. Furthermore, we are able to identify a significant positive value effect of cash flow hedging as a result of facilitating a more costefficient liquidity policy. Taken together, our results identify a specific mechanism through which hedging affects corporate financial policies and firm value.
Our paper adds to prior literature in a number of important ways. First, it suggests that derivative hedging and liquidity policies are jointly determined, thus emphasizing the importance of studying them together rather than in isolation as has been the common practice. Second, it uncovers important channels through which hedging and liquidity policies interact. We identify a substantial industry effect on the ability to hedge cash flow risks, and argue that lines of business that lend themselves more naturally to cash flow hedging entail greater firm reliance on lines of credit in lieu of cash holdings. Third, our hand-collected data on hedging is a considerable improvement relative to previous studies. By taking advantage of SFAS No. 133, we are able to separate, to our knowledge for the first time, between cash flow derivative hedging and non-cash 2 Cash flow based financial covenants are one way through which hedging might affect liquidity choices. More broadly, hedging can reduce the costs of tapping external capital markets (e.g., by reducing bankruptcy costs), thus allowing firms to employ a cost-effective liquidity policy that relies less on costly internal resources. flow derivative hedging. 3 The decomposition of derivative hedging thus allows us to solve the puzzling lack of connection between hedging and cash found, for example, by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) .
Previous literature considered corporate risk management and corporate liquidity policies separately. Corporate hedging has been studied both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, there is a large literature on corporate hedging motives. 4 Empirically, the literature finds that derivatives reduce risk (e.g., Guay (1999) , Jin and Jorion (2006) , and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2008) ). The overall effect on firm value is, however, unclear (e.g., Guay and Kothari (2003) , Adam and Fernando (2006) , and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2008) ). There is also a growing body of work on cash holdings. Consistent with the precautionary saving theory, the evidence presented in the cash literature suggests that firms with riskier cash flows hold more cash, and that cash plays an important role when market frictions might force firms to forego valuable future investments (e.g., Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2009), and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) ).
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The theoretical literature on bank lines of credit (e.g., Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1987) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) , and Martin and Santomero (1997) ) argues that similar to cash reserves, lines of credit should play an important liquidity role. However, as Sufi (2009) points out, the contingent lines of credit that exist in the marketplace are distinct from the committed lines of credit described in the theoretical literature. Accordingly, his main finding suggests that companies prefer lines of credit 3 Previous studies examine either smaller samples (see, e.g., Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) , Graham and Rogers (2002), Guay (1999) , Guay and Kothari (2003), Haushalter (2000) , Jin and Jorion (2006) , Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Tufano (1996) ) or use samples that are only based on a yes/no hedging indicator (see, e.g., Mian (1996) , Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2007) , Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2009) ).
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Examples include: limiting deadweight losses of bankruptcy (Smith and Stulz (1985) ); Convexity of taxes and managerial risk-aversion (Graham and Smith (1999), Stulz (1984) , Smith and Stulz (1985) ); Underinvestment costs (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) ); Information asymmetry (DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, 1995) ); Expost (after debt issuance) risk-management motivation (Purnanandam (2008) ).
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Further consistent with this view, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) find that the secular increase in corporate cash holdings over the past two decades was accompanied by the increase in idiosyncratic risk documented by Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) and Irvine and Pontiff (2009). over cash when their cash flows are high, because low expected cash flows might trigger the violation of cash flow-based financial covenants on the line of credit. 6 Although, as our model implies, the firm's uses of derivative hedging, lines of credit, and cash holdings are related, there is virtually no work studying all three together. The goal of this paper is to bridge this gap by investigating the interplay between these three choices, and provide an analysis of the mechanisms through which hedging policies affect liquidity choices and firm value.
Our results uncover a strong industry clustering in the use of cash flow hedging. Even after controlling for firm-level determinants of hedging, the inclusion of industry dummies substantially increases the adjusted R 2 . Thus, we use a battery of industry-level instruments for cash flow hedging to capture firms' ability to hedge cash flow risks, and to identify the causal effects of cash flow hedging on corporate liquidity policy and value.
Our identification strategy reveals a significant negative relation between cash holdings and cash flow hedging, suggesting that cash flow derivative hedging is a substitute for cash.
These findings suggest that the decomposition of total hedging resolves the puzzling lack of relation between derivative hedging and cash holdings found in prior studies (e.g., Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) ). As in these studies, we find no significant relation between cash and total hedging. We do, however, find a strong negative relation between cash and cash flow hedging.
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Our findings also suggest that companies that use derivatives to hedge their cash flow risks prefer lines of credit over cash holdings. We follow Sufi (2009), and define a firm's bank liquidity ratio as the ratio between its available lines of credit and its overall 6 Additional empirical work on lines of credit includes Melnik and Plaut (1986) and Shockley and Thakor (1997) who show that lines of credit are used as means of liquidity insurance, and Yun (2009) who shows that antitakeover laws push firms to hold more cash relative to lines of credit (and vice versa for internal governance).
Two related papers are Hausalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) , who find a substitution relation between cash holdings and the use of currency swaps in a product market (predation risk) context, and Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2007) , who find a negative relation between the use of derivatives and the quick ratio. liquidity resources (i.e., lines of credit and cash holdings). Our results show a significant positive relation between our instruments for cash flow hedging and the bank liquidity ratio. As a robustness test, we show that our results also hold in a simultaneous model framework, which takes into account the simultaneity of corporate liquidity and hedging policies.
Finally, we explore the value implications of cash flow hedging and its interaction with the liquidity policy. In our model, the equilibrium value of the firm is positively related to the proportion of its hedged cash flows. In equilibrium, all firms should hedge their cash flows and we should observe no value effect of hedging. However, =if the firm's ability to hedge its cash flows is limited by the line of business it operates in, then we should observe a positive relation between industry-driven hedging and the value of the firm. We use the part of cash flow hedging that can be attributed to the industry as an instrument and show that it has a significant effect on the value of the firm. Specifically, we follow Fama and French (1998) and Dittmar and MahrtSmith (2007) , and estimate the value of cash flow hedging using the market-to-book ratio. Our results indicate a positive relation between industry-driven cash flow hedging and firm value, thus suggesting that the ability to pursue a more efficient liquidity policy due to cash flow hedging enhances firm value. Overall, our results identify a previously unexplored channel through which cash flow hedging facilitates reliance on cost-effective external financing, thus enhancing firm value.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents our model. Section II describes our data. Section III studies the determinants of cash flow hedging, and presents nonparametric evidence on its relation to cash holdings and lines of credit. Section IV applies our identification approach to investigate the implications of cash flow hedging for corporate liquidity and value.
Section V gives concluding remarks.
I. Model

A. Setup
In this section, we present a simple model to illustrate how cash flow hedging affects liquidity choices and the value of the firm. Our model considers the role of cash flow hedging in affecting corporate liquidity policy. Specifically, we study how the firm's ability to hedge a fraction of its cash flows affects its choice between cash holdings and bank lines of credit. We show that cash flow hedging allows the firm to rely more on bank lines of credit, in lieu of cash holdings, for liquidity provision. Importantly, we do not assume that cash flow hedging mechanically enhances firm value. Instead, in our specification, hedging is mean-preserving, that is, it does not affect the expected value of future cash flow. Hedging increases firm value due to the discontinuity introduced by financial covenants written on lines of credit. It lowers the likelihood of violating a financial covenant, thus increasing the cost efficiency of the firm's liquidity policy, and as a consequence its overall value.
The time line of the model has three dates, 0, 1, and 2. At time 0, the firm is an ongoing concern, and has a cash flow from existing assets. Also at time 0, the firm has the option to invest in a long term project that requires an investment of today and pays off at time 2.
The firm expects to have access to another investment opportunity at time 1. If the firm invests at time 1, it generates a payoff of at time 2. At time 1, the firm receives an uncertain cash flow from existing assets, , with a strictly positive probability density function 0, a cumulative density function , support , , and an expected value of .
The production functions · and · are increasing, concave and continuously differentiable. We assume that the discount factor is 1, everyone is risk neutral, and the cost of investment goods at dates 0 and 1 is equal to 1. We also assume that the cash flows and are not verifiable and thus cannot be contracted upon. Therefore, the firm cannot use these cash flows to raise funds from outside investors. It can, however, obtain access to a bank line of credit by using its existing assets as collateral.
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Risk neutrality implies that the maximal amount of the bank line of credit equals . Importantly, the line of credit is not entirely committed; it includes a financial covenant that conditions its ex-post availability at time 1 on the realization of the firm's cash flow. If , the cash flow at time 1, is lower than the pre-specified threshold, denoted A, the covenant is violated and the bank is no longer committed to provide the line of credit. Therefore ex-ante, at time 0, the bank will only provide a line of credit if .
In what follows, we assume that Eq. (1) is satisfied.
The company pays a proportional commitment fee to gain access to the line of credit. We denote the amount of obtained line of credit by B, and the proportional commitment fees paid by the firm to the bank by βB. Without loss of generality, we assume perfect competition across banks. Banks simply break even after the firm repays the drawn down portion of its line of credit at time 2 using the payoffs generated by its investments. Thus, the only deadweight cost associated with external financing in the form of a bank line of credit is the commitment fee.
This specification incorporates the cost efficiency of bank lines of credit highlighted in previous work (e.g., Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) , and Gatev and Strahan (2006) 
While hedging does not affect the expected value of cash flow, it decreases the probability of violating a financial covenant. Note that: 
Define . Eq. (1) implies that when we differentiate with respect to , we get:
This (and our assumption that the density function is strictly positive) implies that:
The interpretation of Eq. (4) is simple. It suggests that as the fraction of cash flow hedging increases, the firm is less likely to violate a financial covenant, even though as Eq. (2) implies, the expected value of cash flow, , is unchanged by the firm's hedging policy.
C. Solution
We are now ready to write the expected value of the firm at time 0:
,
The first term in Eq. (5) To derive the optimal amount of cash and bank line of credit, we differentiate Eq. (5) with respect to C and B and write the two first order conditions respectively:
Substituting Eq. (6b) into Eq. (6a), and then differentiating Eq. (6a) and (6b) with respect to α yield respectively:
Next, we introduce the following notation:
Solving Eq. (7a) and Eq. (7b) for and using the notation in Eq. (8) gives:
To determine the effect of hedging on the optimal quantity of cash holdings and lines of credit, note that the properties of the production function imply the following for the terms defined in Eq. (8):
These properties, combined with Eq. (3b) and our assumption that the density function is strictly positive, imply that:
Eq. (10) 
Eq. (11) suggests that we should observe a positive relation between the ability to hedge cash flows and the bank liquidity ratio. In our empirical investigation, we identify firms' industry as a substantial determinant of the ability to hedge cash flows. We therefore examine the relation between industry-level instrumented cash flow hedging and the firm's bank liquidity ratio.
Consistent with Eq. (11), we find a significant positive relation between the two.
We further examine the value implications of our model. A straightforward application of the envelope theorem suggests that as long as B 
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These shortcomings of the current regulation force us to construct our sample by hand-collecting the data. Therefore, we limited most of our analysis to S&P 500 industrial firms.
However, in some of our industry analyses and robustness tests, we expanded the data to include all industrial S&P 1500 companies for the last two years of our sample. Next, we describe the data collection process.
The first stage of the process is to search for the following keywords in each company's items 7a and 8 of the 10-k report: "notional," "derivative," "hedge," "forward," "future," and "swap." In the second stage, we read all paragraphs surrounding the keywords and examine (a) whether we can identify the total notional amount of derivatives used by the company, and (b) whether we can identify the notional amounts of cash flow hedges and fair value hedges. In the best-case scenario, we find full information on both (a) and (b). Then we are able to extract data not only on the total notional amount of hedges (and the decision to hedge) but also on the notional amounts for cash flow hedges and fair value hedges (and the decision to employ cash however, that in this scenario the variable that corresponds to the total notional amount of hedges (total hedge) is not missing, and the dummy variable that represents the existence ("yes"/ "no")
of hedges in general (total hedge dummy) equals to one ("yes").
There are also cases in which companies do not disclose the notional amount of the derivatives that they report they use. For example, suppose that company A reports that it uses forwards as cash flow hedges, but does not disclose their notional amount. In this case, the variables total hedge and cash flow hedge will be missing. But since we do know that this company is engaged in hedging activity in general and cash flow hedging activity in particular, the variables total hedge dummy and cash flow hedge dummy will both equal one.
We also assign missing values to observations where the notional amount of the derivatives is not disclosed in dollar amounts. For instance, a company can disclose that it uses future contracts on five million barrels of oil as cash flow hedges, but not disclose their dollar notional amount. As before, we assign a value of one for both total hedge dummy and cash flow hedge dummy, but missing values for total hedge and cash flow hedge.
Our second data source is DealScan, from which all our data on bank lines of credit is 11 Note that the notional amount of derivatives that are used for hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation and the notional amounts for derivatives not designated as hedging instruments are included in the total notional amount of hedges but not in the notional amounts of fair value or cash value hedges.
collected. In particular, for each firm-year in our 2002-2007 S&P 500 sample, we document whether the firm had access to a revolving credit facility that year (a "yes/no" variable), as well as the total amount of credit (used and unused). These variables are computed across all revolving credit facilities that the firm had access to in that year. Lastly, our firm-level accounting data comes from Compustat's annual files. We collect data on firms' total assets, cash holdings, sales, cash flows, capital expenditures, short-term and long-term debt, dividends, stock repurchases, and investment opportunities (using Tobin's Q). In Table VIII , we detail the construction of the various variables used throughout the paper. A major concern with this evidence, however, is that it does not take into account the endogeneity of the hedging and liquidity decisions of the firm. To overcome this concern and obtain causal identification, we make use of the structure imposed by our theory, and investigate in what follows the effect of the ability to hedge cash flows on the choice between cash holdings and bank lines of credit, namely the liquidity ratio. The next subsection is therefore devoted to studying the determinants of cash flow hedging; it shows that a firm's industry is an important, exogenous determinant of its ability to hedge its cash flows.
III. Cash Flow Hedging: Nonparametric Correlations and Cross-Sectional Determinants
A. Nonparametric Evidence
B. Cross-Sectional Determinants of Cash Flow Hedging
Our identification strategy hinges on the measurement of a firm's ability to hedge its cash flow risk. To investigate the determinants of the ability to hedge cash flow risks, we explore the cross-sectional variation in the use of cash flow derivatives. Standard models of risk management suggest that when capital markets are not frictionless, companies should benefit from hedging their cash flows. These benefits include limiting deadweight losses of bankruptcy (Smith and Stulz (1985) , Purnanandam (2008)), tax advantages arising from the convexity of taxes in the presence of risk-averse managers (Graham and Smith (1999 ), Stulz (1984 ), Smith and Stulz (1985 ), limiting underinvestment costs (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) ), and reducing the costs of information asymmetry (DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, 1995) ).
Thus, these models suggest that it is optimal for all firms to hedge. Why, then, do some companies not hedge? In Table III , we provide evidence suggesting that hedging is heavily clustered by industry, which implies that the nature of a company's business might be a key determinant of its ability to hedge. found to explain derivative hedging (e.g., Purnanandam (2008)). Column (1) corresponds to total hedging, whereas Columns (2) and (3) correspond to cash flow hedging and fair-value hedging respectively. Columns (4) through (6) re-estimate the regressions in Columns (1) through (3), respectively, only including industry fixed effects.
The main takeaway from Table III For robustness, we repeat our analysis using the overall predicted value from Column (5), as well as the isolated, industry-predicted value implied by Column (5). In addition to the substantial explanatory power these Instrumental Variables have based on the results in Table III, this identification strategy has the additional benefits of relying on an industry-level, arguably exogenous instrument, that is consistent with the framework put forth by our theory. Thus, in the remainder of the paper, we use these instruments to investigate the implications of cash flow hedging for the firm's liquidity policy and value.
IV. Cash Flow Hedging and the Liquidity Policy
A. Main Results
To study the relation between derivative hedging and corporate liquidity policy, Table IV estimates panel regressions explaining firm-level bank liquidity ratios (Columns (1) through (3)), as well as cash holdings (Columns (4) through (6)). The bank liquidity ratio is defined in Sufi (2009), and is defined as the ratio of the firm's available lines of credit to its overall liquidity resources (i.e., the sum of lines of credit and cash).
To overcome endogeneity and investigate the causal effect of hedging on liquidity policy, we use an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, and measure the firm's ability to hedge from a first-stage regression given in Column (5) of The results in Columns (1) through 3 suggest that companies that use derivatives to hedge their cash flow risks tend to substitute more cash with lines of credit. We start by estimating the overall effect of total hedging on the liquidity ratio. Column (1) shows a non-significant relation, even at the 10% level, between the liquidity ratio and total hedging. The effects become significant once we isolate the cash flow hedging component. In this case (Columns (2) and (3)), we find that the coefficient on the instrumented cash flow hedging is large and highly significant.
Based on Column (2), a one standard deviation increase in cash flow hedging is associated with an increase of 9.8% in the liquidity ratio.
Importantly, Column (3) shows that once we isolate the industry portion of our instrumented cash flow hedging, the effect on the liquidity ratio becomes even stronger. This further supports the validity of our instrument and our overall theoretically-driven approach that relies on the identification of the ability to hedge. Also, note that Columns (2) and (3) Columns (4) through (6) of Table IV (3) and (4) show that these effects are insignificant when total hedging, rather than cash flow hedging, is considered. This is consistent with previous findings and highlights the importance of isolating cash flow hedging from total hedging. Table VI reports additional robustness tests. One source of concern is that our sample is biased toward large firms in the S&P 500 index, and therefore unrepresentative of the universe of U.S. industrial public firms. To deal with this issue, we hand-collect detailed derivative hedging information on the entire universe of S&P 1500 industrial companies from their 10-k statements for the last 2 years of our sample, 2006 and 2007. We use a similar data collection process to the one we used for our S&P 500 sample (see Section II above).
The first 2 columns of Thus, we use the industry-portion predicted values from the regression in Column 5 of Table III .
The results do not change if instead we use the overall predicted value from that regression. The results in Columns (1) and (2) suggest that the positive relation between the bank liquidity ratio and cash flow hedging, as well as the negative relation between cash holdings and cash flow hedging continue to hold for all industrial S&P 1500 companies. As Columns (1) and (2) of Table VI show, these relations are all highly statistically significant at the 1% level.
Another source of concern is that our statistical significance is overstated due to the imperfect controls for clustering across time and companies, especially due to the relatively constant composition of our sample of companies across the years. To deal with this concern, the remainder of Across all annual regressions, cash flow hedging is positively related to the liquidity ratio at the 1% level, and cash holdings are negatively related to cash flow hedging at the 1% level.
Note that the magnitudes of the effects are generally similar to the effects found in Table IV .
Taken together, the results in this subsection imply that our main results are robust to different empirical specifications and subsamples, and are not driven by our methodology or sampling procedure.
V. The Value Implications of Cash Flow Hedging
Previous empirical literature on corporate hedging finds that derivatives reduce risk (e.g., Guay
(1999), Jin and Jorion (2006), and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2008) ). The overall effect on firm value is, however, unclear (e.g., Guay and Kothari (2003) , Adam and Fernando (2006), and Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2008) ). This paper extends the existing literature in a number of important ways. First, it identifies a specific mechanism through which hedging might affect firm value, namely the ability to pursue a more cost-effective liquidity policy that relies on less costly externally-provided capital. Second, it emphasizes the importance of separating between cash flow derivative hedging and fair value hedging. Separating the two is especially important since the theoretical literature on corporate hedging has mainly focused on cash flow hedging (e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985) ), Graham and Smith (1999), Stulz (1984) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) , DeMarzo and Duffie (1991, 1995) , Purnanandam (2008)).
Finally, it addresses the endogeneity both theoretically and empirically by considering the firm's ability to hedge, as implied by its industry affiliation. (12), that a greater ability to hedge cash flow risks enhances firm value as it reduces the liquidity premium borne by the firm. The first column in Table VII In Columns (2) through (5) of Table VII , we re-estimate the value regressions with our instrumented hedging variables. Column (2) reports the results for the instrumented total hedging, and consistent with our previous findings, shows no significant relation between total hedging and firm value. These results are also consistent with the mixed evidence found in previous studies of corporate hedging. Next, in Column (3), we separate total hedging into cash flow hedging and fair value hedging, as instrumented by the regressions in Table III. The results are striking: Cash flow hedging has a strong positive effect on firm value, significant at the 1% level. The magnitudes are also economically significant: A one standard deviation increase in instrumented cash flow hedging implies an increase of 2.3% in the firm's market to book ratio.
Importantly, we do not find a similar effect for fair value hedging. This result is consistent with previous theoretical literature on corporate derivative hedging, and also with most of fair value hedging being swaps from fixed rate debt to floating rate debt driven by investor demand rather than by risk management considerations.
In Columns (4) and (5), we re-estimate the regressions with the industry portion of the predicted values from the regressions in Table III . The results are similar to those in Columns (2) and (3): Total hedging, as well as fair value hedging, have no significant effect on firm value. In contrast, cash flow hedging has a significant effect on firm value. The magnitude of the effects is once again economically significant: A one standard deviation increase in industry-instrumented cash flow hedging implies an increase of 3.1% in the firm's market to book ratio.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This We find that cash flow hedging reduces the firm's precautionary demand for cash and allows it to rely more on bank of lines credit, relative to cash reserves, for liquidity provision. Furthermore, we are able to identify a significant positive value effect of cash flow hedging as a result of facilitating a more cost-efficient liquidity policy. Taken together, our results identify a specific mechanism through which hedging affects corporate financial policies and firm value, and emphasize the importance of studying corporate hedging and liquidity policies together. (1) and (4)), the amount of cash flow hedging (Columns (2) and (5)), and the amount of fair value hedging (Columns (3) and (6)), all normalized by total assets. In Columns (1)-(3), firm level variables are included. Columns (4)-(6) also includes industry fixed effects based on 3-digit SIC codes. All variables are described in Table VIII . emphLag represents one-year lag. All regressions include year dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. * , * * , * * * represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
where Hedge is taken to be either Cash Flow Hedge (Columns (1) and (2)) or Total Hedge (Columns (3) and (4)). This system of equations is estimated using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). In the first stage, the endogenous variables Liq Ratio and Hedge are regressed on all exogenous variables, i.e., Z 1 and Z 2 . In the second stage, the predicted values from the first stage are used as instruments for the endogenous variables (represented by an * ). All regressions include year and industry dummies (not reported). For the second stage regressions, robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. * , * * , * * * represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table VIII . ∆2 represents 2-year future changes (X(t + 2) − X(t)) and ∆L2 represents 2-year lagged changes (X(t) − X(t − 2)). Robust standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses. * , * * , * * * represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) Age is the number of years since the firm first appeared on Compustat with non-missing book assets.
CAPEX is capital expenditure (capx) over book assets (at).
CF hedge propensity is computed using predicted values from the regression estimates in Column (5) of Table III .
Cash flow hedge dummy is an indicator set to 1 if the firm reported a positive notional amount of cash flow derivative hedging, and 0 otherwise.
Cash flow hedge represents the total (identifiable) notional amount of cash flow derivative hedging over book assets (at).
Cash flow volatility is the industry's equal-weighted average cash flow volatility over the prior 10 years.
Cash flow is the sum of income before extraordinary items (ib) and depreciation, and amortization (dp), over book assets (at).
Cash is cash and short-term investments (che) over book assets (at).
Debt is the sum of debt in current liabilities (dlc) and long-term debt (dltt), over book assets (at).
Dividends is the sum of common and preferred dividends (dvp + dvc).
EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (ebitda) over book assets (at).
Earnings before EI is the sum of income before extraordinary items (ib), interest expenses (xint), income taxes (txdi), and investment tax credit (itci).
FV hedge propensity is computed using predicted values from the regression estimates in Column (6) of Table III .
Fair value hedge dummy indicator set to 1 if the firm reported a positive notional amount of fair value derivative hedging, and 0 otherwise.
Fair value hedge is the total (identifiable) notional amount of fair value derivative hedging over book assets (at).
Foreign sales represents the ratio of foreign sales (from Compustat geographical segments) to total sales of the firm (at).
Industry CF hedge propensity represents the part of the CF hedge propensity corresponding to the industry fixed effects in Column (5) of Table III .
Industry FV hedge propensity represents the part of the FV hedge propensity corresponding to the industry fixed effects in Column (6) of Table III .
Industry Tot hedge propensity is computed using predicted values from the regression estimates in Column (4) of Table III . Inst ownership measures the percentage institutional ownership in the firm.
Interest Exp represents interest expenses (xint).
Leverage represents the sum of long term debt (dltt) and debt in current liabilities (dlc) over common equity (ceq).
Line of credit amount is the total amount of credit (used and unused), across all revolving credit facilities, that the firm should have access to (according to DealScan) over book assets (at).
Line of credit dummy is an indicator set to 1 if the firm should have access to a revolving credit facility according to DealScan, and 0 otherwise.
Liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of outstanding lines of credit to total liquidity (i.e., the sum of outstanding lines of credit and cash reserves).
Net working capital is current assets (act) minus current liabilities (lct) minus cash (che), over book assets (at).
Net worth is defined as book assets (at) minus cash (che) minus total liabilities (lt), all divided by book assets (at).
Payout is the sum of total dividends (dvt) and the purchase of common and preferred stock (prstkc), over book assets (at).
R&D is the ratio of R&D expenses (xrd) over book assets (at), set to zero if missing.
Sales volatility is the 10-year standard deviation of sales (sale) over total assets (at).
Size is the natural logarithm of book assets (at).
Tangibles is one minus intangible assets (intan) over book assets (at).
Tobin's Q is computed as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , and outliers are handled by bounding Q above at 10, following the alternative measure of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) . Specifically, it is the sum of the market value of assets book assets (at) and market value of common equity (csho × prcc), minus the sum of common equity (ceq) and deferred Taxes (txdb), all over the sum of 0.9×book value of assets (at) and 0.1 × market value of assets.
Total hedge dummy is an indicator set to 1 if the firm reported a positive notional amount of derivative hedging, and 0 otherwise.
Total hedge propensity is computed using predicted values from the regression estimates in Column (4) of Table III .
Total hedge represents the total (identifiable) notional amount of derivative hedging over book assets (at).
